Tue 16 Jan 2018

## Computational Quadrinitarianism (Curious Correspondences go Cubical)

Posted by Gershom Bazerman under Uncategorized[12] Comments

Back in 2011, in an influential blog post [1], Robert Harper coined the term "computational trinitarianism" to describe an idea that had been around a long time — that the connection between programming languages, logic, and categories, most famously expressed in the Curry-Howard-Lambek correspondence — should guide the practice of researchers into computation. In particular "any concept arising in one aspect should have meaning from the perspective of the other two". This was especially satisfying to those of us trying learning categorical semantics and often finding it disappointing how little it is appreciated in the computer science community writ large.

#### 1. Categories

Over the years I've thought about trinitarianism a lot, and learned from where it fails to work as much as where it succeeds. One difficulty is that learning to read a logic like a type theory, or vice versa, is almost a definitional trick, because it occurs at the level of reinterpretation of syntax. With categories it is typically not so easy. (There is a straightforward version of categorical semantics like this — yielding "syntactic categories" — but it is difficult to connect it to the broader world of categorical semantics, and often it is sidestepped in favor of deeper models.)

One thing I came to realize is that there is no one notion of categorical semantics — the way in which the simply typed lambda calculus takes models in cartesian closed categories is fundamentally unlike the way in which linear logics take models in symmetric monoidal categories. If you want to study models of dependent type theories, you have a range of approaches, only some of which have been partially unified by Ahrens, Lumsdaine and Voevodsky in particular [2]. And then there are the LCCC models pioneered by Seely for extensional type theory, not to mention the approach that takes semantics directly in toposes, or in triposes (the latter having been invented to unify a variety of structures, and in the process giving rise to still more questions). And then there is the approach that doesn't use categories at all, but multicategories.

Going the other way, we also run into obstacles: there is a general notion, opposite to the "syntactic category" of a type theory, which is the "internal logic" of a category. But depending on the form of category, "internal logic" can take many forms. If you are in a topos, there is a straightforward internal logic called the Mitchell–Bénabou language. In this setting, most "logical" operations factor through the truth-lattice of the subobject classifier. This is very convenient, but if you don't have a proper subobject classifier, then you are forced to reach for other interpretations. As such, it is not infrequently the case that we have a procedure for deriving a category from some logical theory, and a procedure for constructing a logical theory from some category, but there is no particular reason to expect that where we arrive, when we take the round-trip, is close to, much less precisely, where we began.

#### 2. Spaces, Logics

Over the past few years I've been in a topos theory reading group. In the course of this, I've realized at least one problem with all the above (by no means the only one) — Harper's holy trinity is fundamentally incomplete. There is another structure of interest — of equal weight to categories, logics, and languages — which it is necessary to understand to see how everything fits. This structure is *spaces*. I had thought that it was a unique innovation of homotopy type theory to consider logics (resp. type theories) that took semantics in spaces. But it turns out that I just didn't know the history of constructive logic very well. In fact, in roughly the same period that Curry was exploring the relationship of combinatory algebras to logic, Alfred Tarski and Marshall Stone were developing *topological* models for intuitionistic logic, in terms of what we call Heyting Algebras [3] [4]. And just as, as Harper explained, logic, programming and category theory give us insights into implication in the form of entailment, typing judgments, and morphisms, so to, as we will see, do spaces.

A Heyting algebra is a special type of distributive lattice (partially ordered set, equipped with meet and join operations, such that meet and join distribute over one another) which has an implication operation that satisfies curry/uncurry adjointness — i.e. such that c ∧ a ≤ b < -> c ≤ a → b. (Replace meet here by "and" (spelled "*"), and ≤ by ⊢ and we have the familiar type-theoretic statement that c * a ⊢ b < -> c ⊢ a → b).

If you haven't encountered this before, it is worth unpacking. Given a set, we equip it with a partial order by specifying a "≤" operation, such that a ≤ a, if a ≤ b and b ≤ a, then a = b, and finally that if a ≤ b and b ≤ c, then a ≤ c. We can think of such things as Hasse diagrams — a bunch of nodes with some lines between them that only go upwards. If a node b is reachable from a node a by following these upwards lines, then a ≤ b. This "only upwards" condition is enough to enforce all three conditions. We can define ∨ (join) as a binary operation that takes two nodes, and gives a node a ∨ b that is greater than either node, and furthermore is the *uniquely least* node greater than both of them. (Note: A general partial order may have many pairs of nodes that do not have any node greater than both of them, or may that may have more than one incomparable node greater than them.) We can define ∧ (meet) dually, as the uniquely greatest node less than both of them. If all elements of a partially ordered set have a join and meet, we have a lattice.

It is tempting to read meet and join as "and" and "or" in logic. But these logical connectives satisfy an additional important property — distributivity: a & (b | c) = (a & b) | (a & c). (By the lattice laws, the dual property with and swapped with or is also implied). Translated for lattices this reads: a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c). Rather than thinking just about boolean logic, we can think about lattices built from sets — with meets as union, join as intersection, and ≤ given by inclusion. It is easy to verify that such lattices are distributive. Furthermore, every distributive lattice can be given (up to isomorphism) as one built out of sets in this way. While a partially ordered set can have a Hasse diagram of pretty arbitrary shape, a lattice is more restrictive — I imagine it as sort of the tiled diamonds of an actual lattice like one might use in a garden, but with some nodes and edges possibly removed.

Furthermore, there's an amazing result that you can tell if a lattice is distributive by looking for just two prototypical non-distributive lattices as sublattices. If neither is contained in the original lattice, then the lattice is distributed. These tell us how distribution can fail in two canonical ways. The first is three incomparable elements, all of which share a common join (the top) and meet (the bottom). The join of anything but their bottom element with them is therefore the top. Hence if we take the meet of two joins, we still get the top. But the meet of any two non-top elements is the bottom and so, if we take the join of any element with the meet of any other two, we get back to the first element, not all the way to the top, and the equality fails. The second taboo lattice is constructed by having two elements in an ordered relationship, and another incomparable to them — again augmented with a bottom and top. A similar argument shows that if you go one way across the desired entity, you pick out the topmost of the two ordered elements, and the other way yields the bottommost. (The wikipedia article on distributive lattices has some very good diagrams to visualize all this). So a distributive lattice has even more structure than before — incomparable elements must have enough meets and joins to prevent these sublattices from appearing, and this forces even more the appearance of a tiled-diamond like structure.

To get us to a Heyting algebra, we need more structure still — we need implication, which is like an internal function arrow, or an internal ≤ relation. Recall that the equation we want to satisfy is "c ∧ a ≤ b < -> c ≤ a → b". The idea is that we should be able to read ≤ itself as an "external implication" and so if c and a taken together imply b, "a implies b" is the portion of that implication if we "only have" c. We can see it as a partial application of the external implication. If we have a lattice that permits infinite joins (or just a finite lattice such that we don't need them), then it is straightforward to see how to construct this. To build a → b, we just look at *every possible* choice of c that satisfies c ∧ a ≤ b, and then take the join of all of them to be our object a → b. Then, by construction, a → b is necessarily greater than or equal to any c that satisfies the left hand side of the equation. And conversely, any element that a → b is greater than is necessarily one that satisfies the left hand side, and the bi-implication is complete. (This, by the way, gives a good intuition for the definition of an exponential in a category of presheaves). Another way to think of a → b is as the greatest element of the lattice such that a → b ∧ a ≤ b (exercise: relate this to the first definition). It is also a good exercise to explore what happens in certain simple cases — what if a is 0 (false)? What if it is 1? The same as b? Now ask the same questions of b.

So why is a Heyting algebra a *topological* construct? Consider any topological space as given by a collection of open sets, satisfying the usual principles (including the empty set and the total set, and closed under union and finite intersection). These covers have a partial ordering, given by containment. They have unions and intersections (all joins and meets), a top and bottom element (the total space, and the null space). Furthermore, they have an implication operation as described above. As an open set, a → b is given by the meet of all opens c for which a ∧ c ≤ b. (We can think of this as "the biggest context, for which a ⊢ b"). In fact, the axioms for open sets feel almost exactly like the rules we've described for Heyting algebras. It turns out this is only half true — open sets always give Heyting algebras, and we can turn every Heyting algebra into a space. However, in both directions the round trip may take us to somewhere slightly different than where we started. Nonetheless it turns out that if we take complete Heyting algebras where finite meets distribute over infinite joins, we get something called "frames." And the opposite category of frames yields "locales" — a suitable generalization of topological spaces, first named by John Isbell in 1972 [5]. Spaces that correspond precisely to locales are called *sober*, and locales that correspond precisely to spaces are said to have "enough points" or be "spatial locales".

In fact, we don't need to fast-forward to 1972 to get some movement in the opposite direction. In 1944, McKinsey and Tarski embarked on a program of "The Algebra of Topology" which sought to describe topological spaces in purely algebraic (axiomatic) terms [6]. The resultant closure algebras (these days often discussed as their duals, interior algebras) provided a semantics for S4 modal logic. [7] A further development in this regard came with Kripke models for logic [8] (though arguably they're really Beth models [9]).

Here's an easy way to think about Kripke models. Start with any partial ordered set. Now, for each object, instead consider instead all morphisms into it. Since each morphism from any object a to any object b exists only if a ≤ b, and we consider such paths unique (if there are two "routes" showing a ≤ b, we consider them the same in this setting) this amounts to replacing each element a with the set of all elements ≤ a. (The linked pdf does this upside down, but it doesn't really matter). Even though the initial setting may not have been Heyting algebra, this transformed setting *is* a Heyting algebra. (In fact, by a special case of the Yoneda lemma!). This yields Kripke models.

Now consider "collapsings" of elements in the initial partial order — monotone downwards maps taken by sending some elements to other elements less than them in a way that doesn't distort orderings. (I.e. if f(a) ≤ f(b) in the collapsed order, then that means that a ≤ b in the original order). Just as we can lift elements from the initial partial order into their downsets (sets of elements less than them) in the kripkified Heyting Algebra, we can lift our collapsing functions into collapsing functions in our generated Heyting Algebra. With a little work we can see that collapsings in the partial order also yield collapsings in the Heyting Algebra.

Furthermore, it turns out, more or less, that you can generate every closure algebra in this way. Now if we consider closure algebras a bit (and this shouldn't surprise us if we know about S4), we see that we can always take a to Ca, that if we send a → b, then we can send Ca → Cb, and furthermore that CCa → Ca in a natural way (in fact, they're equal!). So closure algebras have the structure of an idempotent monad. (Note: the arrows here should not be seen as representing internal implication — as above they represent the logical turnstile ⊢ or perhaps, if you're really in a Kripke setting, the forcing turnstile ⊩).

Now we have a correspondence between logic and computation (Curry-Howard), logic and categories (Lambek-Scott), and logic and spaces (Tarski-Stone). So maybe, instead of Curry-Howard-Lambek, we should speak of Curry-Howard-Lambek-Scott-Tarski-Stone! (Or, if we want to actually bother to say it, just Curry-Howard-Lambek-Stone. Sorry, Tarski and Scott!) Where do the remaining correspondences arise from? A cubical Kan operation, naturally! But let us try to sketch in a few more details.

#### 3. Spaces, Categories

All this about monads and Yoneda suggests that there's something categorical going on. And indeed, there is. A poset is, in essence, a "decategorified category" — that is to say, a category where any two objects have at most one morphism between them. I think of it as if it were a balloon animal that somebody let all the air out of. We can pick up the end of our poset and blow into it, inflating the structure back up, and allowing multiple morphisms between each object. If we do so, something miraculous occurs — our arbitrary posets turn into arbitrary categories, and the induced Heyting algebra from their opens turns into the induced category of set-valued presheaves of that category. The resultant structure is a presheaf topos. If we "inflate up" an appropriate notion of a closure operator we arrive at a Grothendieck topos! And indeed, the internal language of a topos is higher-order intuitionistic type theory [10].

#### 4. Spaces, Programming Languages

All of this suggests a compelling story: logic describes theories via algebraic syntax. Equipping these theories with various forms of structural operations produces categories of one sort or another, in the form of fibrations. The intuition is that types are spaces, and contexts are *also* spaces. And furthermore, types are *covered* by the contexts in which their terms may be derived. This is one sense in which we it seems possible to interpret the Meillies/Zeilberger notion of a type refinement system as a functor [11].

But where do programming languages fit in? Programming languages, difficult as it is to sometimes remember, are more than their type theories. They have a semantic of computation as well. For example, a general topos does not have partial functions, or a fixed point combinator. But computations, often, do. This led to one of the first applications of topology to programming languages — the introduction of domain theory, in which terms are special kinds of spaces — directed complete partial orders — and functions obey a special kind of continuity (preservation of directed suprema) that allows us to take their fixed points. But while the category of dcpos is cartesian closed, the category of dcpos with only appropriately continuous morphisms is *not*. Trying to resolve this gap, one way or another, seems to have been a theme of research in domain theory throughout the 80s and 90s [12].

Computations can also be concurrent. Topological and topos-theoretic notions again can play an important role. In particular, to consider two execution paths to be "the same" one needs a notion of equivalence. This equivalence can be seen, stepwise, as a topological "two-cell" tracing out at each step an equivalence between the two execution paths. One approach to this is in Joyal, Nielson and Winskel's treatment of open maps [13]. I've also just seen Patrick Schultz and David I. Spivak's "Temporal Type Theory" which seems very promising in this regard [14].

What is the general theme? Computation starts somewhere, and then goes somewhere else. If it stayed in the same place, it would not "compute". A computation is necessarily a path in some sense. Computational settings describe ways to take maps between spaces, under a suitable notion of topology. To describe the spaces themselves, we need a language — that language is a logic, or a type theory. Toposes are a canonical place (though not the only one) where logics and spaces meet (and where, to a degree, we can even distinguish their "logical" and "spatial" content). That leaves categories as the ambient language in which all this interplay can be described and generalized.

#### 5. Spaces, Categories

All the above only sketches the state of affairs up to roughly the mid '90s. The connection to spaces starts in the late 30s, going through logic, and then computation. But the categorical notion of spaces we have is in some sense impoverished. A topos-theoretic generalization of a space still only describes, albeit in generalized terms, open sets and their lattice of subobject relations. Spaces have a whole other structure built on top of that. From their topology we can extract algebraic structures that describe their shape — this is the subject of algebraic topology. In fact, it was in axiomatizing a branch of algebraic topology (homology) that category theory was first compelled to be invented. And the "standard construction" of a monad was first constructed in the study of homology groups (as the Godement resolution).

What happens if we turn the tools of categorical generalization of algebraic topology on categories themselves? This corresponds to another step in the "categorification" process described above. Where to go from "0" to "1" we took a partially ordered set and allowed there to be multiple maps between objects, to go from "1" to "2" we can now take a category, where such multiple maps exist, and allow there to be multiple maps *between maps*. Now two morphisms, say "f . g" and "h" need not merely be equal or not, but they may be "almost equal" with their equality given by a 2-cell. This is just as two homotopies between spaces may themselves be homotopic. And to go from "2" to "3" we can continue the process again. This yields n-categories. An n-category with all morphisms at every level invertible is an (oo,0)-category, or an infinity groupoid. And in many setups this is the same thing as a topological space (and the question of which setup is appropriate falls under the name "homotopy hypothesis" [15]). When morphisms at the first level (the category level) can have direction (just as in normal categories) then those are (oo,1)-categories, and the correspondence between groupoids and spaces is constructed as an equivalence of such categories. These too have direct topological content, and one setting in which this is especially apparent is that of quasi-categories, which are (oo,1)-categories that are built directly from simplicial sets — an especially nice categorical model of spaces (the simplicial sets at play here are those that satisfy a "weak" Kan condition, which is a way of asking that composition behave correctly).

It is in these generalized (oo,1)-toposes that homotopy type theory takes its models. And, it is hypothesized that a suitable version of HoTT should in fact be the initial model (or "internal logic") of an "elementary infinity topos" when we finally figure out how to describe what such a thing is.

So perhaps it is not that we should be computational trinitarians, or quadrinitarians. Rather, it is that the different aspects which we examine — logic, languages, categories, spaces — only appear as distinct manifestations when viewed at a low dimensionality. In the untruncated view of the world, the modern perspective is, perhaps, topological pantheism — spaces are in all things, and through spaces, all things are made as one.

*Thanks to James Deikun and Dan Doel for helpful technical and editorial comments*

[1] https://existentialtype.wordpress.com/2011/03/27/the-holy-trinity/

[2] https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.04310

[3] http://www.sciacchitano.it/Tempo/Aussagenkalk%C3%BCl%20Topologie.pdf

[4] https://eudml.org/doc/27235

[5] http://www.mscand.dk/article/view/11409

[6] https://www.dimap.ufrn.br/~jmarcos/papers/AoT-McKinsey_Tarski.pdf

[7] https://logic.berkeley.edu/colloquium/BezhanishviliSlides.pdf

[8] www2.math.uu.se/~palmgren/tillog/heyting3.pdf

[9] http://festschriften.illc.uva.nl/j50/contribs/troelstra/troelstra.pdf

[10] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022404980901024

[11] https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.0263

[12] https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~martin/Research/Oldpapers/synthetic91.pdf

[13] http://www.brics.dk/RS/94/7/index.html

[14] https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10258

[15] https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/homotopy+hypothesis